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Abstract Recent studies have called for a better under-
standing of the link between networking and entrepre-
neurial performance. We provide such understanding in
three ways: by focusing on a specific entrepreneurial
context (franchise systems), by developing a multi-
faceted theoretical framework and by highlighting a
contingency that may affect the networking-
performance link. We combine knowledge and learning
perspectives with a networking perspective to develop
and test a multi-faceted framework on the effects of
franchisee networking with peers within a franchise
system (‘peer networking’) on franchisee unit perfor-
mance. In particular, we argue that the performance
benefits that franchisees draw from networking with
their peers vary between low, medium and high
performing franchisees. We use ordinary least squares
(OLS) and Quantile Regression analyses to test our
hypotheses with empirical data from a Dutch franchise
system. Our results confirm that structural, resource and
relational facets of franchisee peer networking affect
unit performance, and that they benefit and harm low,
medium, and high performing franchisees differently.
Keywords Entrepreneurship . Franchising . Local
knowledge . Organizational learning . Peer network
JEL classification L25 Firm Performance; Size,
Diversification, and Scope . L26 Entrepreneurship . D83
Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge,
Communication, Belief, Unawareness . D85Network
Formation and Analysis: Theory. C21Quantile
Regression
1 Introduction
1.1 Networking and entrepreneurial performance
Many studies have found that networking improves
entrepreneurial performance by providing entrepreneurs
with access to a variety of important resources (e.g.
Aldrich and Zimmer 1986; Hoang and Antoncic 2003;
Slotte-Kock and Coviello 2009). However, other studies
have pointed at the downsides of entrepreneurial net-
working—such as opportunity costs and governance
problems—that may negatively affect firm performance
(e.g. Watson 2007; Jack 2010; Rauch et al. 2016).
Overall, there is still little consensus on how and under
what conditions entrepreneurial networking affects firm
performance (Stam et al. 2014). This paper contributes
to this discussion by arguing and empirically demon-
strating that networking can have differential effects for
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different types of entrepreneurs; more specifically, we
find that for some entrepreneurs networking is a bless-
ing, whereas for others it can be a curse.
Recent literature reviews and meta-analyses point at
several critical issues in the networking-performance
literature that may have caused the debate on the
networking-performance link. First, the literature has
suffered from conceptual vagueness regarding the types
of resources shared, the types of networks in which they
are shared and the types of entrepreneurial performance
under study (Hoang and Antoncic 2003; Jack 2010).
Second, researchers have largely focused on the effect of
isolated network characteristics, such as an entrepre-
neur’s network position or relationship quality, on en-
trepreneurial outcomes. This has resulted in a lack of
consistent theoretical frameworks that take into account
multiple facets of entrepreneurial networking in
explaining performance (Jack 2010; Rauch et al.
2016). Third, only relatively few studies have taken into
account contingencies, such as firm or industry charac-
teristics, that might condition the effects of networking
on entrepreneurial performance (Stam et al. 2014;
Rauch et al. 2016).
Related to the abovementioned critical issues, our
study contributes to the literature on the entrepreneurial
networking-performance link in several ways. First, we
decrease conceptual vagueness and provide more de-
tailed knowledge of networking effects by focusing on
franchise systems as a specific type of entrepreneurial
context in which franchisees share a specific type of
resource (i.e. ideas and knowledge on local marketing)
with their fellow franchisees within the same franchise
system (i.e. peers), resulting in a specific type of entre-
preneurial performance (i.e. franchisee unit sales). Be-
sides the fact that franchise systems are an important
entrepreneurial context, such systems are very suitable
for studying entrepreneurial phenomena since franchise
systems provide a ‘natural laboratory’ where several
conditions are standardized across franchisee-
entrepreneurs (Szulanski and Jensen 2008).
Our second contribution is that we develop and test a
multi-faceted framework of entrepreneurs’ network
characteristics and their effects on performance. We
build on recent studies (Batjargal 2003; Stam et al.
2014) to distinguish three facets of an entrepreneur’s
network: structural, resource and relational characteris-
tics. In recent years, several studies on the networking-
performance link in different organizational contexts
have argued for combining structural network
characteristics, such as an actor’s network position, with
other types of network variables, such as relational
quality (Moran 2005), conduct (Afuah 2013) or partner
attributes (Rodan and Galunic 2004). However, so far,
these studies have not provided a consistent framework
capturing the most relevant facets at once. Our study
provides such a framework.
Our final contribution to the networking literature is
that our study is among the few to include a contingency
that may influence the effects of networking on entre-
preneurial outcomes (following Stam et al. 2014; Rauch
et al. 2016). Contingencies can be present at different
levels, such as the individual entrepreneur (e.g. Ritter
and Gemünden 2003), the firm (Stam et al. 2014), the
type of industry (Rauch et al. 2016) or the economy
(Stam et al. 2014). Some general networking studies
have looked at actors’ network utilization by studying
the skills and abilities that influence how actors are able
to utilize the resources acquired via their networks (e.g.
Tsai 2001; Ritter and Gemünden 2003; Baker et al.
2016). However, entrepreneurship studies have rarely
accounted for the heterogeneity among entrepreneurs in
terms of how they utilize the resources deriving from
their entrepreneurial networks (see Hayter (2015) for a
brief discussion and Arenius and De Clercq (2005) and
Seo et al. (2014) for exceptions). Our study contributes
by including the entrepreneur’s firm performance as an
important contingency variable (cf. Seo et al. 2014). We
propose that the level of performance reached by an
entrepreneur affects the benefits the entrepreneur is able
to draw from his networking activity.
1.2 Franchisee networking and entrepreneurial
performance
We focus on an important and unique type of entrepre-
neurial context, namely business format franchise sys-
tems. As such, we also contribute to a considerable
stream of literature aimed at describing and explaining
franchising as an entrepreneurial phenomenon (Combs
et al. 2011; Ketchen et al. 2011). Franchise systems are
important since in many countries, they account for a
major share of business; for example, they account for
about 40, 52 and 32% of retailing sales in respectively
the USA, Australia and Germany (Dant et al. 2011).
Franchise systems are unique because franchisees are
semi-autonomous entrepreneurs who operate their busi-
nesses in a specific geographical location under a stan-
dardized business format with a uniform strategic
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positioning towards customers (Kaufmann and Eroglu
1998). Franchisees are part of a franchise system with
the franchisor as the umbrella organization and with
fellow franchisees (i.e. peers) and possibly franchisor-
owned units operating under the same business format
in different locations (Gassenheimer et al. 1996).
Our study addresses an important knowledge gap in
the franchising literature by studying how franchisees
acquire their local knowledge and how this affects their
unit performance. Knowledge is crucial in business
format franchise systems (e.g. Darr et al. 1995;
Gorovaia andWindsperger 2013), and many researchers
have used knowledge and learning perspectives regard-
ing franchising (e.g. Szulanski and Jensen 2008; Winter
et al. 2012). These studies have focused on various
research questions, such as what factors affect a franchi-
sor’s knowledge transfer mechanisms (Gorovaia and
Windsperger 2013), whether systems or units within
systems benefit more from the standardized knowledge
of their franchisors or from the franchisees’ local knowl-
edge (e.g. Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Jensen and
Szulanski 2007) or how specific types of units influence
organizational learning and hence system performance
(e.g. Darr et al. 1995; Sorenson and Sørensen 2001).
These studies typically assume that franchisees have
both the room and the inclination to use their local
knowledge to adapt the franchisor’s business format to
their own circumstances to improve their unit perfor-
mance (Kaufmann and Eroglu 1998; Sorenson and
Sørensen 2001). To attain such an optimal local fit,
franchisees will try to increase the quantity and quality
of their local knowledge. Since the franchisor has
knowledge on the system level and, consequently, less
knowledge on the franchisee’s local level, an important
question is how franchisees use their personal contact
networks to acquire their local knowledge and how this
affects their unit performance. To our knowledge, this
question has not yet been addressed in the franchising
literature. Since franchisees have a huge impact on their
franchise system’s success (Michael and Combs 2008),
the lack of understanding on franchisee local knowledge
acquisition and its impact on unit performance forms an
important research gap, which we narrow by means of
our study.
In studying the performance effects of franchisee
networking activities, we aim to avoid the aforemen-
tioned three critical issues in the networking-
performance literature. First, we prevent conceptual
vagueness by focusing specifically on franchisees’
acquisition of local marketing knowledge from their
franchisee peers and the impact on franchisees’ unit
sales performance. Franchising literature so far has paid
very little attention to knowledge sharing among fran-
chisee peers. Only the studies of Darr et al. (1995), Darr
and Kurtzberg (2000) and Turner and Pennington
(2015) have explicitly focused on knowledge transfer
among franchisees within franchise systems. Darr et al.
(1995) found that operational knowledge is mostly
shared between units owned by the same franchisee
and less likely to be shared among units owned by
different franchisees, whereas Darr and Kurtzberg
(2000) found that strategic similarity of franchisees fa-
cilitates knowledge transfer among them.More recently,
Turner and Pennington (2015) studied antecedents of
franchisees’ inclination to share knowledge. However,
the effects of knowledge sharing on franchisee unit
performance have remained unclear. Second, we avoid
a focus on some isolated network characteristics by
developing and testing a multi-faceted theoretical frame-
work distinguishing a network’s structural, resource and
relational characteristics (Batjargal 2003; Stam et al.
2014). Finally, we take into account an important con-
tingency variable by proposing that different franchisee
types (i.e. low performers, medium and high per-
formers) experience differential effects from their peer
networking activities. This approach also fits with a
more general tendency in the franchising literature of
including the role of idiosyncratic franchisee character-
istics in explaining unit-level outcomes (e.g. Kidwell
et al. 2007; Cochet et al. 2008).
2 Theoretical backgrounds and hypotheses
2.1 Defining franchisee local knowledge
Franchisors and franchisees have very different types of
knowledge (Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Szulanski and
Jensen 2006). The franchisor mainly has generic knowl-
edge at the system level: ideally, the franchisor knows
which attributes of the business format are replicable
and worth replicating, how these attributes are created
and in which types of environments they are worth
replicating (Winter and Szulanski 2001). Franchisors
typically codify their knowledge and distribute stan-
dardized routines in the form of a defined business
format to their franchisees (Szulanski and Jensen
2008; Winter et al. 2012; Gorovaia and Windsperger
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2013). As a result, the knowledge provided by the
franchisor will not be perfect for any one location, but
it should be generic enough to be valuable to franchisees
at all locations. However, each franchisee needs knowl-
edge about the local environment of its unit (e.g. cus-
tomer preferences, competition, labour market develop-
ments) and the management of its unit (e.g. local HRM
policies, local marketing activities) to run the local unit
effectively. We define this type of knowledge as fran-
chisee local knowledge. A franchisee’s local knowledge
is idiosyncratic, and it is mostly non-codified as opposed
to codified (Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Knott 2003).
Consequently, the franchisee’s local knowledge is gen-
erally not possessed by the franchisor, and franchisees
need other sources (their peers in this study) for acquir-
ing their local knowledge.
‘Franchisee local knowledge’ is still a general classi-
fication, and different types of local knowledge can be
relevant in a franchise setting. We focus on a franchi-
see’s local marketing knowledge: knowledge about the
local market needs, the competitive situation and the
marketing instruments that can be used locally next to
the marketing instruments as imposed by the franchisor.
Such marketing instruments typically include the prod-
ucts and services offered, the unit interior and exterior,
promotion activities and price levels. A franchise sys-
tem’s centralization level (cf. Windsperger 2004;
Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2011) determines how
much freedom franchisees have in adopting local mar-
keting instruments, for example offering new products/
services or adopting their own promotion activities. It is
not uncommon for franchisors to allow their franchisees
to develop local tailor-made marketing activities, al-
though usually these are developed in addition to the
system-wide marketing activities executed by the fran-
chisor (Windsperger 2004). In sum, our study focuses
on the characteristics of franchisees’ peer networks for
acquiring local marketing knowledge, which we link to
an objective marketing performance measure, namely
unit sales levels.
2.2 Theoretical framework
In recent years, several studies (e.g. Tsai 2001; Hansen
2002; Baker et al. 2016) have combined a networking
perspective with knowledge and learning perspectives
to explain a range of outcomes of networking behaviour.
The main idea behind such studies is that actors’ learn-
ing from network partners requires access to valuable
knowledge via those partners and, subsequently, actors
need to be able to utilize this knowledge.
Having access to valuable knowledge relates to three
different facets of an entrepreneur’s network (Batjargal
2003, Stam et al. 2014): structural characteristics
(‘where you reach’), resource characteristics (‘whom
you reach’) and relational characteristics (‘how you
reach’). First, the structural characteristics refer to the
structure of an actor’s overall network of relations and
include for example the entrepreneur’s network size or
network position (Tsai 2001; Batjargal 2003; Reinholt
et al. 2011). We focus on the entrepreneur’s network
position as this oft-studied type of characteristic cap-
tures the informational (dis)advantages that result from
an entrepreneur’s position in the knowledge sharing
network. The more strategic the position of an actor
within a network, the more (and the more timely) access
the actor has to the knowledge and expertise of others in
the network (Reinholt et al. 2011; Stam et al. 2014;
Hayter 2015). This type of variable is important because
it affects the quantity of knowledge to which an actor has
easy access to.
Second, the network’s resource characteristics refer
to the resources that an actor has access to through the
entrepreneur’s network partners. These partner re-
sources are important because they determine the poten-
tial value that an actor can derive from its partners
(Adler and Kwon 2002; Zaheer and Bell 2005). Exam-
ples of such variables reflecting the value of network
partners are ‘resource richness’ (Batjargal 2003), part-
ners’ skills, qualities or know-how (Kwon and Adler
2014) or partners’ innovative capabilities (Zaheer and
Bell 2005). In this study, we use the term partner quality
to indicate the level of relevant marketing-related skills,
qualities and know-how of the network partners which
provides an actor with access to a high quality of
knowledge.
The third and final group of networking variables are
the relational characteristics, reflecting the nature of
interactions between an actor and its network partners.
These include, for example, the duration of relationships
(Kim and Aldrich 2005) or the geographic distance
(Kolympiris and Kalaitzandonakes 2013). Prior re-
search has pointed at tie strength as an important rela-
tional network characteristic affecting the ease of
knowledge transfer between partners (e.g. Uzzi 1997;
Van Wijk et al. 2008). Strong ties consist of frequent
interaction with peers nearby, while weak ties point at
limited access to peers located far away. We use this
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concept of tie strength to capture the ease of knowledge
transfer between an actor and its network partners.
The above three groups of network characteristics
impact the quantity, the quality and the ease of transfer
of knowledge that an actor has access to via its network
partners. However, the access an actor has to valuable
knowledge is only one side of the coin; the extent to
which knowledge access translates into firm perfor-
mance also depends on how well actors can actually
utilize this knowledge. We refer to this as an actor’s
‘network utilization’ (Baker et al. 2016). Recent work
by Stam et al. (2014), Hayter (2015) and Rauch et al.
(2016) provides examples of studies demonstrating that
characteristics and capacities of actors affect if and to
what extent they can benefit from the network resources
they have access to. The meta-analysis of Rauch et al.
(2016), however, clearly demonstrates that the majority
of network studies still does not include such contingen-
cies. Building on learning and knowledge perspectives,
an actor’s network utilization is contingent upon two
characteristics. The first one is the actor’s ability to
recognize, assimilate and apply new knowledge. We
refer to this as absorptive capacity (following many
authors, such as Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Tsai
2001). The second one is the extent to which the ac-
quired knowledge is useful given the entrepreneur’s
idiosyncratic circumstances (Seo et al. 2014; Baker
et al. 2016). The literature points at two important as-
pects of such knowledge usefulness. First, new knowl-
edge is particularly useful for an actor if it stems from a
partner that has a high partner quality but that is also
more knowledgeable than the actor itself (cf. Lane and
Lubatkin 1998; Monteiro et al. 2008). This relative
position of the actor vis-à-vis peers determines the po-
tential added value to be gained from peers. High quality
actors often have less to learn, particularly from lower
quality partners with a small knowledge base. Second,
the usefulness of knowledge for a specific actor depends
on whether the knowledge offered fits with the actor’s
knowledge needs, which in turn depends on a firm’s
characteristics such as a firm’s innovation orientation
(Xu 2015) or firm performance (Seo et al. 2014). For
example, Xu (2015) demonstrates that firms that aim for
radical innovation need access to broad rather than deep
knowledge, and Seo et al. (2014) find that low
performing firms benefit more from access to basic
knowledge on primary business functions rather than
knowledge on secondary business functions, whereas
for high performers it is the other way around.
Translating the above arguments to our theoretical
framework for a franchise context, we posit that a fran-
chisee’s structural (i.e. network position), resource (i.e.
partner quality) and relational (i.e. tie strength) network
characteristics affect the quantity and quality of the
knowledge to which the franchisee has access and the
ease of knowledge transfer. Moreover, our framework
points at network utilization as an important contingen-
cy variable influencing the actual utilization of the ac-
cessible knowledge by the franchisee. Following Seo
et al. (2014), we posit that attained franchisee unit
performance is an adequate indicator of such network
utilization for three reasons. First, linked to the absorp-
tive capacity argument, high-performance franchisees
are likely to have a higher absorptive capacity than
low-performance franchisees; high performers already
have the experience and knowledge needed to identify
and successfully implement new knowledge in their
units. Second, linked to the relative position argument,
we propose that high-performance franchisees may ben-
efit differently from their peers compared to low
performing franchisees since the relative knowledge
position of high performers is strong. Finally, related
to the knowledge needs argument, we posit that low
performing franchisees require basic knowledge on
how to attain higher sales levels, whereas the high
performing franchisees already understand their busi-
ness and need broader and more complex knowledge
to take their business to the next level (cf. Seo et al.
2014; Xu 2015).
Figure 1 depicts an overview of the theoretical frame-
work. In Section 2.3, we present our study’s hypotheses.
2.3 Hypotheses
2.3.1 Structural network characteristics: network
position
Structural network characteristics capture ‘where you
reach’: does an actor only have access to knowledge of
direct network partners or does the actor’s knowledge
scope reach further? An actor’s position in a specific
network can impose constraints or offer opportunities
(Tsai 2001; Zaheer and Bell 2005; Reinholt et al. 2011).
An important concept reflecting the advantageousness
of an actor’s network position is betweenness centrality
(Freeman 1977, 1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994;
Fang et al. 2016; Lai 2016). The higher the betweenness
centrality of an actor, the more access it has to other
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actors and the more influence it has as an intermediary
between other actors (Hanneman and Riddle 2005;
Reinholt et al. 2011). The main argument is that central
actors can act as an information gateway that dissemi-
nates and receives relevant information and knowledge
throughout the network; as a result, the more central the
actor, the greater its access to knowledge and other
actors’ best practices, which may positively affect this
actor’s performance (Soh 2010; Reinholt et al. 2011;
Fang et al. 2016).
In this study, a franchisee’s position in its peer net-
work presents the franchisee with constraints or oppor-
tunities to access marketing knowledge. The peer net-
work has clear boundaries and consists of all franchisees
of the same franchise system, and each franchisee has a
specific position in this peer network. A franchisee’s
betweenness centrality reflects this franchisee’s oppor-
tunities to access information and knowledge from its
peers, both directly (through the direct ties that the
franchisee maintains) and indirectly (through the ties
maintained by the franchisee’s direct partners and fur-
ther ties in the network that are connected to those). This
leads to the following hypothesis:
& H1a: Centrality in the peer network is positively
associated with unit performance.
While an actor’s network centrality affects the quan-
tity of knowledge to which an actor has access, whether
an actor benefits from its network or not depends on its
network utilization (Baker et al. 2016). The low absorp-
tive capacity of low performing franchisees is expected
to affect this network utilization; unsuccessful franchi-
sees will be less able to benefit from the quantity of
knowledge inherent to a central network position as
their lower absorptive capacity prevents them from rec-
ognizing, assimilating and applying knowledge in their
own units. This leads to the following hypothesis:
& H1b: The positive association of centrality with unit
performance is stronger for high performers than for
medium and for low performers.
2.3.2 Resource network characteristics: partner quality
Resource network characteristics capture ‘whom you
reach’: does an actor have access to partners with
performance-enhancing knowledge and expertise or
does an actor mainly connect to partners who have little
beneficial knowledge and insights to share? Firms vary
in their managerial priorities (or ‘strategic orientations’)
that guide their attitudes, practices and knowledge de-
velopment, which in turn affect their performance (Darr
and Kurtzberg 2000; Noble et al. 2002). Considering
these managerial priorities, we build on Darr and
Kurtzberg (2000) by posing that network partners will
develop two basic types of performance-enhancing
knowledge: external ‘sales’ knowledge aimed at
attracting revenue streams from customers and internal
‘operational’ knowledge, relating to effectively securing
and allocating the firm’s resources. Together, these
reflect both the external and internal capabilities
of firms.
Peer sales quality Research has found the knowledge
and expertise of an actor’s partners to contribute to the
actor’s performance (Adler and Kwon 2002; Batjargal
2003; Chiu et al. 2006). For example, entrepreneurs
seeking to improve innovative performance are likely
Fig. 1 Theoretical framework.
The theoretical framework is to be
read as follows: unit performance
is affected (solid lines) by three
types of networking
characteristics, whose effects are
expected to vary with unit
performance itself (dashed lines)
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to benefit from networking with partners with strong
innovative capabilities (Zaheer and Bell 2005). Similar-
ly, firms seeking to achieve a growth in revenue streams
benefit from networking with partners who already
achieved such high revenue streams (Stuart 2000), and
firms seeking to improve their sales performance need
network partners with marketing knowledge (Tran et al.
2010). In sum, the network partners’ quality has an
important influence on an actor’s performance. We hy-
pothesize that firms that are networking with peers that
have shown to be able to generate high sales levels will
experience a positive effect on their own sales perfor-
mance. Firms with high sales levels (‘sales quality’)
demonstrate that they are able to successfully attract
customers and are likely to have relevant marketing
knowledge and expertise (cf. Arnett and Wittmann
2014). Their potential knowledge contributions make
them attractive network partners (Darr and Kurtzberg
2000; Chiu et al. 2006). This argumentation leads to the
following hypothesis:
& H2a: Peer sales quality is positively associated with
unit performance.
Having high quality network partners influences the
‘absolute’ quality of the knowledge a franchisee has
access to. However, as pointed out in Section 2.2, the
knowledge has to be useful given the franchisee’s spe-
cific circumstances. First, following the relative position
argument (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Monteiro et al.
2008), high performing franchisees already possess high
quality knowledge themselves and are thus in a high
relative position compared to their peers and will benefit
less from these peers. In contrast, unsuccessful franchi-
sees can benefit a lot from networking with high sales
quality peers because they have much to improve. Sec-
ond, building on the knowledge needs argument, low
performing franchisees benefit more from the high qual-
ity sales peers since these can provide them with rele-
vant basic knowledge on how to increase sales, whereas
high performers already have such knowledge and need
more complex knowledge to further improve their sales
performance (cf. Chiu et al. 2006). This leads to the
following hypothesis:
& H2b: The positive association of peer sales
quality with unit performance is stronger for
low performers than for medium and for high
performers.
Peer operational quality Whereas ‘peer sales quality’
focuses on the extent to which a franchisee’s peers are
successful in attracting sales, another type of knowledge
that will be beneficial to franchisees is knowledge about
successful operational performance (Darr and Kurtzberg
2000; Noble et al. 2006). The ability to attract sales
largely captures a firm’s ability to successfully interact
with its external environment and generate financial
streams from the environment into the firm (Seo et al.
2014). Alternatively, operational performance refers to a
firm’s ability to manage its outgoing financial streams in
relation to what is flowing in and requires aptitude in
managing its internal operations. ‘Peer sales quality’
requires a successful external activity, whereas ‘peer
operational quality’ requires successful external activity
in combination with successful internal activity. High
operational quality peers thus have a more diverse and
complex knowledge base than peers with low operation-
al quality; high operational quality peers have a sound
causal understanding of the complex relationships be-
tween internal and external activities, leading to the
profitability of their units (cf. Rodan and Galunic
2004). Given the large knowledge base of these high
operational quality peers, we hypothesize that franchi-
sees will benefit from networking with them. This leads
to the following hypothesis:
& H3a: Peer operational quality is positively associat-
ed with unit performance.
However, we expect low performing and high
performing franchisees to differ in their knowledge
needs and thus in the extent to which they can benefit
from these peers’ diverse and complex knowledge ba-
ses. High performing franchisees have demonstrated
that they are able to exploit their business effectively
in their local environment and that they already have the
basic knowledge required to attain high sales levels (cf.
Seo et al. 2014). Further sales growth will ask for
creative strategies to further explore the local opportu-
nities, and for this, the franchisee will need diverse and
complex knowledge that triggers its creativity (cf. Tran
et al. 2010). In contrast, low performing franchisees first
have to focus on attracting more sales by improving
their basic knowledge (Seo et al. 2014), and they will
thus have less use for diverse and complex knowledge
(Tran et al. 2010). Moreover, the high absorptive capac-
ity of the high performers will also enable them to
assimilate and apply the complex knowledge. Low
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performers will struggle more using this diverse and
complex knowledge because of their lower absorptive
capacity. This leads to the following hypothesis:
& H3b: The positive association of peer operational
quality with unit performance is stronger for high
performers than for medium and for low performers.
2.3.3 Relational network characteristics: tie strength
Relational network characteristics capture ‘how you
reach’; does an actor have relationships that are close
by and easy to reach? How often does he/she interact
with these partners? Tie strength is a widely used con-
cept comprising these two different aspects of distance
and frequency. Strong ties comprise close and frequent
relations, whereas weak ties are distant and infrequent
(Afuah 2013; Stam et al. 2014). As we will explain
below, distance and frequency have distinct effects on
the beneficial outcomes of the ties.
Peer distance The concept of distance can have differ-
ent meanings in organizational contexts, such as cogni-
tive, social or geographical distance (Dolfsma and Van
der Eijk 2015). We focus on geographical distance
between franchisees and their peers since geographical
distance between units is a defining characteristic of
franchise systems (Darr et al. 1995; Darr and
Kurtzberg 2000).
Previous research has described both the advantages
and disadvantages of geographical distance.1 Networking
with distant peers may result in the acquisition of new
and diverse knowledge that is not available in the fran-
chisee’s immediate environment (Darr and Kurtzberg
2000; Dolfsma and Van der Eijk 2015); on the other
hand, geographical distance decreases the ease of inter-
action and knowledge interpretation (i.e. knowledge
transfer) and increases the costs of knowledge transfer
(Cramton 2001; Kolympiris and Kalaitzandonakes
2013). Effective acquisition of local marketing knowl-
edge from peers requires a careful understanding of these
peers’ contextual circumstances and distance may really
hamper this understanding (Cramton 2001).We therefore
hypothesize that the multiple disadvantages of peer dis-
tance outweigh the advantage, which leads to:
& H4a: Peer distance is negatively associated with unit
performance.
Generally speaking, distant ties have a relatively high
newness of knowledge, low ease of knowledge transfer
and high costs. Considering the differences between
high and low performing franchisees as regards absorp-
tive capacity and knowledge needs, we hypothesize that
the effects of peer distance also differ between these
groups. The difficulties with the interpretation of local
marketing knowledge from geographically distant peers
will be larger for low performing franchisees than for
high performing franchisees. Also, the usefulness of this
new knowledge will be less for low performing franchi-
sees as they may benefit more from basic knowledge
than from diverse knowledge. Hence:
& H4b: The negative association between peer dis-
tance and unit performance is stronger for low per-
formers than for medium and for high performers.
Peer communication frequency Close relationships can
only develop when actors are able to meet each other
and exchange ideas frequently. Having a high frequency
of communication with one’s network partners has the
advantage of an easy knowledge flow, but it has the
disadvantage of providing reducing marginal gains by
spawning less new knowledge at each subsequent inter-
action and perhaps even creating redundancy of knowl-
edge (Stam et al. 2014; Rauch et al. 2016). Entrepre-
neurs face resource and time constraints (Cooper et al.
1997; Christen et al. 2009), which means they cannot
spend excessive amounts of time on networking
(Watson 2007). The more frequent a franchisee’s peer
network contacts, the higher the costs. Although com-
munication frequency has positive effects on knowledge
flow, we propose that these benefits are outweighed by
the reduction of the value of the acquired knowledge
and the high resource costs associated with high-
frequency networking, both in managerial time and
money (Watson 2007). We therefore propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
& H5a: Peer communication frequency is negatively
associated with unit performance.
1 Some sources focus on partner geographical proximity (e.g.
Kolympiris and Kalaitzandonakes 2013; Darr and Kurtzberg 2000),
which we consider the antonym of geographical distance in our
argumentation.
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Building on the knowledge needs argument, we pro-
pose that high performing franchisees already have a
well-developed local marketing knowledge base, which
increases the chances of them receiving redundant, non-
actionable, knowledge. As a result, theymay suffer even
more from frequent network contacts than low
performing franchisees (cf.Watson 2007). Hence, costly
frequent interactions with contacts that provide redun-
dant information are particularly detrimental to high
performers, leading to:
& H5b: The negative association between peer com-
munication frequency and unit performance is stron-
ger for high performers than for medium and for low
performers.
3 Methodology
3.1 Empirical setting and data collection
3.1.1 Empirical setting and sample
We collected empirical data within one franchise
system to control for country, industry and fran-
chise system differences. Even though the choice
for one franchise system may limit the external
validity of our study, it substantially improves in-
ternal validity (Davies et al. 2011). Given that this
project is among the first to study the impact of
franchisee (peer) networking on unit performance,
it is important to first establish internal validity
since internal validity is an important prerequisite
for external validity (Gibbert et al. 2008). Specific
characteristics of the country, industry and the fran-
chise system may influence the importance of hav-
ing local market knowledge for franchisees and the
availability of such knowledge. Between countries
and industries, there may for example be institu-
tional or cultural differences. At the level of fran-
chise systems, there may for example be differences
in the geographical dispersion of units (Szulanski
and Jensen 2008), in central izat ion levels
(Windsperger 2004; Mumdžiev and Windsperger
2011) or in the use of instruments for knowledge
sharing (Dada et al. 2012).
ENJOY (pseudonym) is a Dutch franchise system
that started in the mid-1990s in a specific sub-sector of
the fast food industry. At the time of data collection
(winter of 2009/2010), many industries were seriously
hurt by the crisis; the fast food industry in the Nether-
lands, however, was relatively stable with .1 to 1.4%
annual growth (Rabobank 2014). At the time of data
collection, the ENJOY system had 105 franchised units
that were owned by 78 franchisees. However, out of
these 105 units, 14 units were different as these were sit-
down restaurants at central train stations and very large
city centres rather than delivery services in suburban
areas. To control for these unit differences, we decided
to focus on the remaining 91 units. These units were
owned by 69 franchisees, of whom 44 participated
in our study. However, due to missing data (espe-
cially for the financial performance data), we used
the responses of 33 franchisees, resulting in a net
response rate of 48%. Regarding the non-respon-
dents, there is no reason to assume that they will
have very different networking characteristics. In
order to quantitatively assess non-response bias,
we have performed several tests by comparing
respondents and non-respondents on different di-
mensions. The Welch t test demonstrates that the
means of total sales between the respondents and
non-respondents are the same (t = .47, p = .64).
The F test shows that the variances of the sales
between the two groups are the same (F = .77,
p = .43). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates
that the sales volumes of the two groups come
from the same distribution (D = .15, p = .64).
The tests thus indicate that non-response bias is
unlikely.
The ENJOY system has a high level of centralization
on several decision areas (cf. Windsperger 2004), such
as assortment, procurement, unit presentation, national
promotion activities, accounting systems, employee
training and investments. However, the ENJOY franchi-
sees still have room to make their own local decisions
regarding pricing, local promotion and employee re-
cruitment. Franchisees’ pricing and local promotion
decisions are typically related to their local marketing
knowledge, which is why we have specifically asked the
franchisees about the networks partners that provide
them with knowledge to make decisions regarding local
promotion and pricing in their own units. By focusing
on these specific local marketing decisions in our inter-
views with the franchisees, we were able to make a
vague concept as ‘local marketing knowledge’ easier
for them to understand.
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3.1.2 Procedures regarding data collection
This paper was part of a larger project to explain fran-
chisee networking characteristics and to understand
their consequences. We collected detailed quantitative
and qualitative data for each franchisee respondent.
Since the complexity of the topic was high and part
of the information might have been regarded as sen-
sitive, we collected the data by means of personal
face-to-face interviews (Emans 2004). An additional
advantage of interviews is that they provide the op-
portunity to gather additional qualitative contextual
data that may help in interpreting the findings from
the quantitative analysis. Each interview took be-
tween 60 and 90 min and took place at the franchi-
see’s unit.
Each interview started with questions on the franchi-
see’s demographics (e.g. number of units owned, years
of experience as an ENJOY franchisee). Obviously, the
largest part of the interview focused on understanding a
franchisee’s structural, resource and relational network
characteristics. We first asked the franchisees a question
about which network partners (i.e. specific individuals)
they consider most important regarding obtaining ideas
for their own local promotion and pricing. These indi-
viduals could belong to the category franchisee peers,
the franchisor, professionals and non-professionals. We
then asked different questions on each partner and the
relationship with these partners, such as the type of
partner, the frequency of contact and a qualitative ex-
planation for the reason why the partner is so important
to the respondent. These questions enabled us to mea-
sure the franchisee’s direct network. We later repeated
this procedure, asking each franchisee to indicate
up to three most important franchisees from the
peer network only. On occasion, this yielded addi-
tional peers, but many of them were already report-
ed by the respondent in the former network ques-
tion. Obviously, in the analyses, we ultimately took
into account any overlap in a franchisee’s peer and
direct network. The advantage of this approach is
threefold: it provided the respondents with the op-
portunity to mention all promotion-relevant con-
tacts, it urged them to zoom in on their peers and
it allowed us with the opportunity to check the
reliability of their answers. Checking reliability
was possible because we asked respondents about
details for every contact mentioned, and details of
contacts that were mentioned twice were asked for
twice as well; we found very little deviation be-
tween the first mention and the second mention of
the same peer, indicating high reliability of the
measurements.
3.2 Issues of measurement
Table 1 summarizes the measurement properties of the
variables in this study.
3.2.1 Dependent variable: unit performance
The ENJOY franchisor allowed us to use objective sales
data per unit from its benchmarking system. The use of
Table 1 Measurement properties
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sales data has several advantages. First, from a theoret-
ical viewpoint, it is highly likely that sales are directly
affected by franchisees’ local marketing activities that
result from the franchisee’s local marketing knowledge.
Second, since the franchisor collected the financial
performance data via its benchmarking system, we
have no issues of common method bias in our
data, and the data provide a good insight into the
relative performance of each unit viz. the other
units. Finally, since fees for the franchisor are
often (largely) based on unit sales, unit sales are
also a relevant measure from a franchisor’s practi-
cal perspective. We measured the performance of
each franchisee as the unit’s total level of sales
over a 43-week period (in January 2009–October
2009). To decrease complexity, we divided total
sales by 1000.
3.2.2 Explanatory variables: franchisee network
characteristics
We measured the franchisee’s peer network ties by
asking them to name their direct contacts with
peers that are important and useful to them for
gathering ideas and information related to local
promotion and pricing. They could name as many
network partners as they wanted; the median num-
ber of ties to other franchisees was three. By the
way the data were collected, network ties were
directed; one franchisee could be in contact with
another franchisee in order to get advice on pric-
ing, but that does not necessarily imply that pric-
ing advice was also returned. Still, advice was
often offered to each other by both parties (reci-
procity was .3).
Betweenness centrality In the literature, there are many
different specific operationalizations of network central-
ity (Lai 2016). We focus on betweenness centrality: the
extent that a franchisee is located on shortest paths
between other franchisees. We measured a franchisee’s
betweenness by the number of shortest paths between all
franchisees in the network that this specific franchisee is
part of, following Brandes (2001). This measure reflects
the extent to which a franchisee is centrally located
between its peers and is likely to be on information-
sharing paths. The higher a franchisee’s betweenness,
the more the franchisee is ‘in the loop’ and the more it is
expected to see what is going on in the interaction
between other franchisees.2
Peer sales quality This variable measures the average
sales (in €1000) of the peer network partners of the
franchisee. We received this information from the fran-
chisor’s benchmarking system.
Peer operational quality This variable measures the
average financial bottom line result or unit profits (in
€1000) of the peer contacts of the franchisee. We re-
ceived this information from the franchisor ’s
benchmarking system.
Peer distance This variable measures the average travel
distance (in minutes) between the franchisee and its peer
contacts.
Peer communication frequency This is measured by the
number of times per month the franchisee engages in
pricing, advertising and marketing-related interaction
with its peer contacts.
3.2.3 Control variables
In general, the performance of a franchised unit depends
on three types of determinants: general environmental
characteristics, local unit characteristics and franchisee
characteristics (Fenwick and Strombom 1998). General
environmental characteristics comprise for example the
industry structure and franchise system characteristics,
and our study controls for such characteristics by focus-
ing on one single franchise system in a specific industry
in one country. The local unit characteristics refer to the
market potential of the units, which is related to the type
of location (urban or rural, Croonen et al. 2016, or the
level of competition, Kidwell et al. 2007). As pointed
2 A concern that is sometimes raised is that the value of the between-
ness of one actor in a network might be negatively correlated with the
betweenness of others and measurements would therefore not be fully
independent. This concern is not of importance in our study. First,
mathematically, the high betweenness of one actor does not necessarily
imply that another actor must have lower betweenness. In fact, the
correlation between the betweenness scores of franchisees across all
dyads is −0.02, which is negligible. Second, any non-independence of
betweenness scores is only problematic if it invalidates the assumption
of independence of disturbances in an OLS model. In our OLS model,
this was tested with the Durbin-Watson test, which showed that the
assumption of error independence cannot be rejected (p < .23). Further,
our main model is the quantile regression model, which does not make
distributional assumptions for the error terms.
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out in Section 3.1.1, this study’s design also largely
controls for these local unit characteristics since all units
operate under the same business format in suburban
locations in which delivery comprises the largest part
of the sales. Finally, franchisees’ personal and behav-
ioural characteristics are important, since these help in
explaining differences in unit outcomes even within a
single franchise system with very similar units (Dant
and Gundlach 1999; Fenwick and Strombom 1998).
This category comprises for example the networking
variables included in our model. As an additional con-
trol variable, we include the franchisee’s experience in
the focal franchise system as this affects the skills of the
franchisee (Dant and Gundlach 1999). The more expe-
rienced the franchisee is in the franchise system, the
more the store’s performance might benefit because
the franchisee has become knowledgeable about what
makes the business format work. We also control for the
number of hours per week the franchisee spends on the
work floor of his/her unit. An entrepreneur’s time is
scarce, and the way entrepreneurs allocate this limited
time among different activities and the attention they
pay to these activities will influence firm performance
(Cooper et al. 1997; Christen et al. 2009). The higher the
number of hours the franchisee spends on the work
floor, the less time and attention the franchisee has to
network and to reflect on his marketing activities, and
the more the focus of the franchisee is likely to shift to
internal day-to-day issues rather than to external sales-
related issues.
3.3 Estimation methods
In our analyses, we combine traditional ordinary least
squares (OLS) with Quantile Regression (QR) and com-
pare the results for both analyses. This also enables us to
assess the value of applying each method, as is often
done in other QR studies (e.g. Goedhuys and
Sleuwaegen 2010; Ramdani and Van Witteloostuijn
2010). We provide a brief primer to QR in the
Appendix.
Traditional regression methods, such as OLS or lo-
gistic regression, are focused on the mean: they summa-
rize the relationship between an outcome and a set of
explanatory variables by describing the mean outcome
for each fixed value of the explanatory variables—OLS
therefore is also known as conditional mean modelling.
A drawback of such a model is that it does not describe
non-central locations, such as the effect that the
explanatory variables may have specifically on obser-
vations in the lower tail or upper tail of the distribution.
Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduced a natural exten-
sion of the linear regression model called quantile re-
gression, which models conditional quantiles as func-
tions of a set of explanatory variables. Whereas the
traditional linear regression model only specifies the
change in the conditional mean of the dependent vari-
able associated with a change in the explanatory vari-
ables, the QR model specifies the changes in the condi-
tional quantile. The researcher can choose which
quantiles (or ‘percentiles’) are of relevance to the re-
search at hand—when the .5 quantile is chosen the
model is better known as median regression.
Since our hypotheses make a distinction between
three groups of franchisees (those in the lower tail of
the performance distribution, those in the middle and
those in the upper tail), we focus on three percentiles:
.25 (representing the effect of the explanatory variables
on a franchisee that only does better than 25% of the
franchisees in the sample), .50 (representing the effect
on a franchisee with median performance) and .75
(representing the effect on a franchisee that achieves a
performance level that is better than that of 75% of the
sample). In this way, we estimate regression coefficients
that pertain to franchisees at each of these performance
levels and compare coefficients and statistical signifi-
cance between them. QR has several statistical advan-
tages over regular regression: it is robust to outliers as
well as to distributional assumptions. Whereas OLS
often relies on larger sample sizes in order to remedy
potentially violated distributional assumptions, QR does
not require larger sample sizes for this purpose. QR can
deal naturally with highly skewed data such as income
or sales, without the need to transform such data into
mode well-behaved data shapes (Koenker 2005; Hao
and Naiman 2007).
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Introduction to the results
The key descriptives and statistics for all variables ap-
pear in Tables 2 and 3. Table 3 shows that performance
correlates positively with occupying a central position in
the peer network, with networking with peers with high
sales quality and with having more experience as a
franchisee in the franchise system. There is a moderate
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positive significant correlation between the average
sales quality of a franchisee’s peers and the peers’ aver-
age operational quality. This makes sense, because
higher sales are likely to contribute positively to opera-
tional results. Unexperienced franchisees also put in
more work floor hours. Separate analyses (not shown)
indicate that there are no multicollinearity issues in any
of our analyses.
We present the results of the OLS and QR models in
Table 4. QR estimates the regression coefficients of the
explanatory variables for franchisees at particular
quantiles in the overall performance distribution: .25
(i.e. low performers), .50 (i.e. medium performers) and
.75 (i.e. high performers). In the distribution of sales in
our sample, the 25th quantile equals a total sales volume
(over the 43 weeks of measurement) of about €159K,
the median sales level is about €228K and the high
performing franchisees at the .75th quantile of the dis-
tribution have a sales level of about €321K. In OLS
analyses, it is common to transform sales volume before
running the analysis (usually, by taking the logarithm),
but this is unnecessary in QR analyses (see the
Appendix).
Since we hypothesize that networking characteristics
may have differential effects on a franchisee depending
on the position of the franchisee in the performance
distribution, we expect differences in parameter esti-
mates and statistical significance between firms along
the three considered quantiles. In Table 4, we present
both the results of the OLS regression and the three
quantile regressions. In the OLS model, we leave the
sales variable untransformed. This maximizes compara-
bility between OLS and the QR results; besides this, the
Shapiro-Wilk statistic of sales is not significant
(p < .72), which suggests that sales is quite normally
distributed.
The type of hypothesis that follows from our
quantile-based arguments (i.e. the ‘b’-versions of the
hypotheses) consists of several components; in a strict
sense, the hypothesis would be rejected as soon as only
one of the components does not hold. As a result, it is
reasonable and more informative to discuss the extent to
which each hypothesis is supported, rather than only
drawing conclusions about the consolidated hypothesis
per se. Besides a discussion of the empirical findings
based on Table 4, we summarize the empirical findings
graphically in Fig. 2, allowing for the visual comparison











Centrality (betweenness) 18.7 33.7 .0–143.7
Peer sales quality (in €1000) 311.0 84.4 106.1–
455.6
Peer operational quality (in
€1000)
234.9 229.2 −465.4 to
502.3
Peer distance (minutes) 39.8 15.8 15–80
Peer communication
frequency (times per month)
5.4 6.9 .3–30.0
Control variables
Franchisee experience (years) 4.6 3.5 1–13
Franchisee work floor hours
(hours per week)
39.8 18.8 8–90
Table 3 Correlation matrix
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. Unit performance –
2. Centrality (betweenness) .54*** –
3. Peer sales quality .30* .13
4. Peer operational quality .21 .02 .55****
5. Peer distance .10 .17 .13 −.01
6. Peer communication frequency .03 .31* −.23 −.20 −.18
7. Franchisee experience .54*** .03 .19 .12 .17 .12
8. Franchisee work floor hours −.58**** −.37** −.24 −.14 .01 −.09 −.43***
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001, levels of significance
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Finally, to assess the robustness of the empirical
findings to alternative model specifications, we ran sev-
eral alternative QR models: such as a model without
peer sales quality, a model without peer operational
quality, a model without both peer sales quality and peer
operational quality and a model without peer distance
(while always maintaining the controls). Either of these
models yielded essentially the same results as those
presented in Table 4. This suggests that the results can
be considered robust.
4.2 Results and discussion for structural network
characteristics: network position
H1a hypothesized that a franchisee’s betweenness cen-
trality in the peer network is positively associated with
unit performance, and H1b proposed that the strength of
this association is stronger for high performers than for
medium and low performers. Supporting H1a, the OLS
regression indeed shows a positive and statistically sig-
nificant association: the more a franchisee is located on
shortest paths between its peers, the higher its unit
performance. Consistent with H1b, we find that the
positive effect of centrality is stronger for high per-
formers (a positive, statistically significant coefficient)
than for low performers. In fact, the coefficient for low
performers is not statistically significant, which indi-
cates that low performers do not benefit from having a
central position, whereas medium and high performers
do. Because the difference between high and medium
performers is not statistically significant (F = 1.13,
p > .1), the hypothesis is largely supported.
These findings are in concert with the absorptive
capacity argument (Tsai 2001; Van Wijk et al. 2008;
Monteiro et al. 2008); as a result of their high absorptive
capacity, high performers may benefit the most from
having access to knowledge. The finding that low per-
formers do not benefit at all also fits with this argument:
their absorptive capacity is simply too low to recognize
and be able to internalize the value of available knowl-
edge in their peer network.
4.3 Results and discussion for resource network
characteristics: partner quality
A franchisee’s partner quality refers to peer sales quality
(H2a and b) and peer operational quality (H3a and b).
We expected peer sales quality to be positively associ-
ated with unit performance (H2a) and that this positive
association is stronger for low performers than for me-
dium and high performers (H2b). The OLS model does
not uncover a statistically significant effect, so H2a is
not supported. However, the QR results do show differ-
ential effects of peer sales quality on unit performance.
Since an OLS model generates a single coefficient for
the (conditionally) ‘average population’, it misses the
differentiating effect of peer sales quality on unit perfor-
mance. Consistent with H2b, we find that low per-
formers benefit from a high peer sales quality (with
p < .088, which is reasonable given the modest sample
size), whereas the high and medium performers do not.
In fact, high performers even suffer from a (small)
negative association between partner sales quality and
unit performance. Although the difference in
Table 4 Results of OLS and QR with unit performance as the dependent variable
Variables OLS QR25 QR50 QR75
Intercept 210.40* (76.49) 73.31 (138.64) 169.72 (120.68) 328.39**** (49.79)
Centrality (betweenness) 1.76**** (.46) 1.51 (1.29) 1.75**** (.38) 2.18**** (.37)
Peer sales quality .06 (.19) .60* (.34) .24 (.31) −.29*** (.09)
Peer operational quality .02 (.07) −.18* (.10) .00 (.818) .12** (.05)
Peer distance −.848 (.89) −.95 (.78) −1.03 (1.08) −.77 (1.03)
Peer communication frequency −3.43 (2.14) −2.45 (4.18) −3.33* (1.73) −5.52**** (1.46)
Control variables
Franchisee experience 14.98*** (4.26) 14.73**** (3.47) 13.31** (6.23) 14.78**** (3.40)
Franchisee work floor hours −1.00 (.84) −1.90 (1.40) −.91 (.80) −.91* (.70)
(Adjusted) R2 .57 .44 .46 .51
n = 33
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001, levels of significance
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coefficients is small, the difference is statistically signif-
icant (F = 7.13, p < .01). Medium performers benefit nor
suffer from having high or low average performing
contacts. Apart from the coefficient for the high per-
formers turning slightly negative, H2b is essentially
supported. An explanation for this negative association
can be found in the marginal benefits for the high
performers relative to the costs (Watson 2007). The
high performers in our data set already have a
high level of performance and will thus learn less
from other high sales performers, whereas they
still suffer from the costs of networking. For the
high performers, the costs of networking thus out-
weigh the benefits.
Regarding peer operational quality, we expected a
positive association with unit performance (H3a) and
that this positive association is stronger for high per-
formers than for medium and for low performers (H3b).
The OLS model again does not uncover an effect (thus
rejecting H3a), whereas the QR model shows that ef-
fects actually differ along performance levels. Consis-
tent with H3b, the QR results show that high performers
benefit positively and significantly from peer operation-
al quality, whereas medium and low performers do not.
The effect for low performers even turns negative (albeit
only significant at p < .09). This difference between the
coefficients is statistically significant (F = 8.29, p < .01).
Again, medium performers do not appear to benefit (or
Fig. 2 Overview of networking effects for the three performance
levels. Estimated effect of betweenness centrality, peer sales qual-
ity, peer operational quality and communication frequency on unit
performance, each time with all other variables at their median
value. Only those lines are shown that represent coefficients that
are statistically significantly different from zero. The thickness of
the line denotes the respective performance levels (running from
thin to thick, see legend)
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suffer) from having contacts with high financial perfor-
mance. H3b is essentially supported; as expected, the
high performers indeed benefit the most from the high
operational quality partners; however, the slight nega-
tive association for the low performers was unexpected.
An explanation for this latter result may be that the low
performers suffer the costs from networking (Watson
2007), but on top of that, the knowledge from their
network partners is too complex for them and does not
fit their specific knowledge needs. Given these low
performers’ low absorptive capacity, this combination
of costly and complex knowledge is likely to cause
problems.
4.4 Results and discussion for relational network
characteristics: tie strength
Hypotheses 4 and 5 relate to a franchisee’s tie strength,
consisting of peer distance and peer communication
frequency. Regarding peer distance, we expected a neg-
ative association between peer distance and unit perfor-
mance (H4a) with a stronger negative association for the
low performers than for the medium and high per-
formers (H4b). Both the OLS and QR models show no
significant effects; hence, H4a and H4b are not support-
ed. Even though several networking studies have argued
for and/or found partner distance as an important net-
work characteristic affecting performance (e.g. Cramton
2001; Kolympiris and Kalaitzandonakes 2013; Dolfsma
and Van der Eijk 2015), our study does not find statis-
tically significant results. An explanation may be the
relative homogeneity of units within franchise systems
compared to other types of networks of entrepreneurs.
Since franchisees all operate under the same business
format in relatively similar local circumstances
(especially in our study as explained in Section 3.1.1),
the problems with knowledge transfer and interpretation
as suggested by previous studies may be smaller. More-
over, developments in ICT in general (e.g. email and
internet) and in franchise systems (e.g. benchmarking
systems and intranet) may have facilitated knowledge
transfer and the interpretation of knowledge from dif-
ferent local units (Brooks 2012).
Regarding peer communication frequency, we hy-
pothesized that communication frequency is negatively
associated with unit performance (H5a) and that this
negative association is stronger for high performers than
for medium and low performers (H5b). The OLS model
does not uncover a significant effect (rejecting H5a),
whereas the QR models show that the negative effect of
interaction frequency is stronger for high and medium
performers (negative, statistically significant coeffi-
cients) than for low performers (seen from the statisti-
cally insignificant coefficient). For medium and high
performers, having increased frequency of promotion-
related contact with peers is negatively associated with
their performance. The difference in effect between
medium and high performers is not statistically signifi-
cant (F = 1.27, p > .1), so they both appear to suffer
negative consequences of similar strength. An explana-
tion is that for medium and high performers the marginal
benefits of having frequent contacts are outweighed by
the costs of networking because the frequent contacts
are likely to produce redundant knowledge (cf. Watson
2007; Stam et al. 2014). Hence, H5b is largely
supported.
5 Summary, conclusion and implications
To summarize, our theoretical framework introduced
three facets of franchisee networking (i.e. structural,
resource and relational characteristics) that are hypoth-
esized to affect franchisee unit performance. Addition-
ally, the framework proposed that the strength of the
effect of each facet of networking is likely to vary
between franchisees with different levels of unit perfor-
mance. Table 5 provides a summary of our key findings.
Based on our OLS and QR results, we can summarize
our key findings as follows. Based on the results of the
OLS analyses, the conclusion would be that only the
structural characteristic betweenness centrality is posi-
tively related to franchisee unit sales performance (for
the whole sample), and all other variables are not rele-
vant. However, the QR results reveal a very different
picture. Although the QR results confirm the rejection of
hypotheses 4a and 4b (peer distance shows no relation-
ship with sales performance), all other hypotheses can
be accepted for part of the performance distribution.
Moreover, the differential effect of unit performance is
consistently present as hypothesized in hypotheses H1b,
H2b, H3b and H5b. High performers will benefit from a
strong network position and peer operational quality,
while they will suffer from having network relationships
with peers with high sales quality and frequent commu-
nication. For the medium performers, only a strong
network position will improve sales performance, and
too much communication will come at the cost of
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decreasing sales. Finally, for the low performers, having
peer relationships with high sales performers will help to
improve sales, while connecting with high operational
performers will be counterproductive. Overall, we may
conclude that what may be a blessing for one group of
franchisee-entrepreneurs is actually a curse for some
others.
As a general conclusion, our findings provide a
deeper insight into the networking-performance link
by developing a multi-faceted framework in a specific
and clearly defined entrepreneurial context (i.e. a fran-
chise system) and by taking into account an important
contingency factor that may affect the networking-
performance relationship. Our results imply the rele-
vance of the multi-faceted framework since the structur-
al, relational and resource network facets of a franchi-
see’s peer network all affect unit performance. More-
over, we find differential effects for franchisee-
entrepreneurs at different ends of the performance dis-
tribution, which justifies the recent calls for more re-
search on contingencies affecting the networking-
performance relationship (e.g. Stam et al. 2014; Rauch
et al. 2016) and contingencies in a franchising context
(e.g. Cochet et al. 2008; Kidwell et al. 2007). Finally,
even though several networking studies have already
pointed at the possible downsides of networking (e.g.
Watson 2007; Jack 2010; Rauch et al. 2016), our study
is among the few to empirically demonstrate such neg-
ative effects of networking. Another important research
implication is thus that future empirical research should
take into account these ‘dark sides’ of networking.
Our study has managerial implications for both fran-
chisors and franchisees. Our findings provide guidance
for franchisors on how to orchestrate knowledge sharing
among the franchisees in their franchise systems. Using
information from their benchmarking systems, franchi-
sors can target different franchisee performance groups
with specific initiatives. Medium and high performing
franchisees benefit from occupying central network po-
sitions but suffer from high communication frequency.
Franchisors could build on these findings by organizing
central events or virtual communities where these fran-
chisees play an important role. Such initiatives help in
supporting the central position of these franchisees,
while preventing them from overextending their inter-
peer communication frequency. Centrally organized
meetings and organized virtual meetings can also ensure
that high performers continue being in touch with those
franchisees with high operational quality.
For low performing franchisees, the franchisor could
stimulate knowledge sharing with high sales quality
peers. By carefully managing the formation of
Table 5 Summary of key findings
Facet Variable Hypothesis Result Conclusiona
Structural Network
position
H1a: positive effect of betweenness
centrality
Supported Although betweenness centrality seems positive
for the sample as a whole, in fact it is only so for




H2a: positive effect of peer sales quality Not
supported
The expected positive effect of peer sales quality
exists for the low performers. The relation for
the other groups is less strong (for the high
performers, it is even negative)
H2b: stronger for low performers Supported




Peer operational quality has a positive effect for the
high performers: an effect that is stronger than
for the other groups. In fact, the relation for the
low performers is even negative
H3b: stronger for high performers Supported
Relational Tie strength H4a: negative effect of peer distance Not
supported
Peer distance has no significant effect on
franchisee unit sales performance
H4b: stronger for low performers Not
supported




Peer communication frequency has a negative
relationship with franchisee sales performance
for the medium and high performers (but not for
low performers)
H5b: stronger for high performers Largely
supported
a Conclusions on the ‘a’ hypotheses are based on OLS, and the conclusions on the ‘b’ hypotheses are based on QR
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franchisee groups or committees, the franchisor could
encourage low performers to be in touch with franchi-
sees that have shown to be competent at consistently
generating high levels of sales, stimulating knowledge
flow to these low performers. The franchisor could also
consider instruments to improve the low performers’
absorptive capacity (e.g. via additional training) in order
to increase these franchisees’ network utilization. In
addition to these franchisor initiatives, there is of course
also a responsibility for franchisees to participate in their
franchisor’s initiatives to manage peer networking and
to proactively manage their own networking behaviours
and absorptive capacity.
6 Limitations and suggestions for future research
Studying a single franchise system allowed us to control
for country, industry and franchise system differences
and thus to improve internal validity at the expense of
external validity (Davies et al. 2011). Given the limited
availability of research on the association between fran-
chisee networking characteristics and unit performance,
the focus on internal validity was a deliberate choice (cf.
Gibbert et al. 2008). Despite the modest sample size, we
do find statistically significant associations between
franchisee networking characteristics and franchisee
unit performance, which is a clear indication of the
presence of such associations. Although there are no
reasons to expect radically different findings in other
contexts, we recommend that the study is replicated in
multiple countries, industries and franchise systems. As
suggested by Stam et al. (2014) and Rauch et al. (2016),
such future studies could then include system-level,
industry-level or country-level contingencies that may
affect the networking-performance relationship. Relat-
edly, our results have pointed at one franchisee-level
contingency (i.e. franchisee unit performance) as an
important factor in explaining the networking-
franchisee performance link. However, additional
franchisee-level contingencies may explain if and to
what extent franchisees benefit from peer networking,
such as the franchisees’ strategic orientations (e.g.
Grünhagen and Mittelsteadt 2005; Darr and Kurtzberg
2000) or the franchisees’ perceptions of intra-brand
competition (e.g. Cochet et al. 2008). Moreover, just
as our study did, such franchisee-level studies could also
benefit from benchmarking data provided by the
franchisor to facilitate comparison and to prevent com-
mon method bias.
Second, our focal franchise system has no company-
owned units and only a few multi-unit franchisees. Even
though this enabled us to study a group of franchisees
with similar characteristics, an interesting area for future
research would be to study differences in networking
behaviours between franchisees and company managers
and between single-unit and multi-unit franchisees. Sev-
eral franchising researchers (e.g. Cliquet and Pénard
2012; Sorenson and Sørensen 2001) pointed out that
franchisees may be more inclined than company man-
agers to engage in local adaptation, whichmay imply that
franchisees are more inclined than company managers to
actively engage in knowledge sharing and networking
behaviours. In a similar vein, multi-unit franchisees may
behave differently from single-unit franchisees due to
different strategic orientations and a larger scale of activ-
ities (Grünhagen andMittelsteadt 2005; Dant et al. 2013).
Multi-unit franchising is not as common in the Nether-
lands as in some other countries such as the USA; how-
ever, we recommend future studies to look for empirical
settings to study this variable in more depth.
A further limitation of this paper is that we assume
the relationship between networking behaviour and firm
performance to be unidirectional and not reciprocal
(which would account for the argument that perfor-
mance may also affect an actor’s networking character-
istics). With this choice, we follow mainstream network
research as presented in recent meta-analyses such as
Rauch et al. (2016) and Stam et al. (2014); however,
future research should take into account the possibility
of reciprocal relationships.
Finally, from a methodological point of view, our
study suggests that it may be valuable to use QR anal-
yses in future research. In our analysis, only one out of
five relevant coefficients was statistically significant in
the OLS model and relying on OLS would result in
researchers concluding that only a single effect is
established in the data, whereas four of five variables
do have statistically significant effects in the QR model.
This is not the result of QR having higher power than
OLS (that is generally not the case) but because QR is
able to uncover effects that are not homogenous
throughout the sample. By shifting attention from
explaining the conditional mean to (multiple) condition-
al quantiles, researchers get findings at higher resolu-
tions. We hope that this approach can inspire theorists
and analysts alike.
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Appendix: a brief primer to Quantile Regression
(QR)
Regression is arguably the most common statistical
method employed by researchers to study the relation-
ships between variables—the purpose of regression
analysis is to expose the relationship between a response
variable and predictor variables. The most popular mul-
tivariable model for analysing a univariate continuous Y
is the linear model:
yi ¼ β0 þ β1xi1 þ…þ βkxik þ εi ð1Þ
where the εi are identically, independently and normally
distributed with mean 0 and a common, albeit unknown,
variance σ2; thus, εi ~N(0, σ
2I). Because of the assump-
tion of a zero mean for the error term, the function β0 +
β1xi1 + … + βkxik in (1) effectively models the mean
value of y, given x—hence, the model’s focus is on
explaining the ‘conditional mean’: E(Y| X) = Xβ. The
coefficients β are typically estimated using an ordinary
least squares procedure where β is determined such that
it minimizes∑ Y i−Xβð Þ 2. OLS regression provides two
pieces of information: (1) the intercept coefficient,
which is an estimate of Y when X is zero, and (2) the
slope coefficient, which represents the incremental
change in Y for a one-unit change in X. If, for example,
a fitted regression model with two predictors were to
yield Y ¼ 1þ 2X 1 þ 3X 2, this would mean that the
average Y increases by 2 when X1 increases by 1. That
same average Y increases by 3 when X2 increases by 1.
QR is an approach to modelling Y that allows a
researcher to shift focus from the conditional mean to
other parts of the conditional distribution of Y. QR
models conditional quantiles of interest (rather than the
conditional mean) and allows the researcher to investi-
gate the effects of the predictors for different quantiles.
Quantile regression was developed by Koenker and
Bassett (1978) as an extension of (1) and is written as:
yi ¼ βq0 þ βq1xi1 þ…þ βqkxik þ εqi ð2Þ
where 0 < q < 1 represents the proportion of the popula-
tion having scores below the quantile at q. For example,
for q = .50, we model the 50th percentile of the distri-
bution of Y (i.e. the median Y, this is better known as
‘median regression’), conditional on the values of X:
Qq(Y| X) = Xβq. Coefficients can be estimated by an
optimization function that minimizes a sum of weighted
absolute vertical deviations, where the weight is 1 − q
for points below the fitted line and q for points above the
fitted line (Davino et al. 2014). QR regression provides
two pieces of information at each estimated quantile:
(1) the intercept coefficient, which is an estimate of Y at
that quantile of Y, and (2) the slope coefficient, which
represents the incremental change in Y for a one-unit
change of X at that quantile of Y. If, for example, a fitted
regression model with two predictors were to yield Y
¼ 1þ 2X 1 þ 3X 2 (for q = .70), this means that the Yat
the 70th quantile increases by 2 when X1 increases by 1.
That same Y at the 70th quantile increases by 3 when X2
increases by 1. For Y at another quantile, the relation
between Y and X might be different which would yield
different intercept and regression coefficients.
The conditional mean approach has attractive prop-
erties, such as statistical efficiency and ease of calcula-
tion and interpretation. However, the approach also has
important drawbacks. To compute p values and confi-
dence limits in (1), we have to assume error term nor-
mality with constant variance. Violation of the normality
assumption or the assumption of constant variance can
cause inaccuracy of standard errors. The normality as-
sumption typically requires a large sample size, in order
for the researcher to be somewhat at ease with the
normality assumption. Alternatively, the QR approach
makes no distributional assumptions other than continu-
ity of Y and, hence, does not rely on large samples to
make distributional assumptions realistic. Second,
heavy-tailed distributions commonly occur in social
phenomena, leading to a preponderance of outliers.
The conditional mean model is heavily influenced by
outliers (Hao and Naiman 2007). The QR model is not
sensitive to outliers. Related to this, researchers often
transform their dependent variable in order to make it
more symmetric and well-behaved. For example, sales
or income data are often log-transformed before running
a regression model. However, the model in (1) is not
invariant to such transformations. Alternatively, the QR
model is invariant to (monotonic) transformations (such
as the logarithm). In fact, the QR model is not affected
by skewness of the dependent variable—it is entirely
robust against it—and nothing is gained (or lost) by
transforming Y beforehand. This is why we used sales
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as a dependent variable in our model, without needing to
log-transform it first.
The most important difference between the models is
that the model in (1) essentially assumes that it is ap-
propriate for all data, which has been termed the ‘one-
model assumption’, whereas QR shifts the focus from
the conditional mean to other parts of the distribution of
Y. For instance, studies of economic inequality are often
interested in the poor (lower tail) and the rich (upper
tail), rather than (only) in the mean earners (Hao and
Naiman 2007). The conditional meanmodel cannot deal
with this situation gracefully, but the QR model is ex-
plicitly suited for this kind of inquiry. In OLS, estimat-
ing potentially different effects for different quantiles
would require to divide the sample into subsamples; for
the research question in our paper, a researcher would
have to split the data into three groups: low performers,
median performers and high performers. This has severe
drawbacks: it reduces the sample size for each group to
one-third of the overall sample and drastically reduces
the variance in the dependent variable (as the value of
the dependent variable is the criterion by which the
subgroups were created). Alternatively, QR does not
require breaking up the data into subsamples: the com-
plete data are employed to estimate the coefficients at
each of the quantiles of interest (the local behaviour near
the specific quantile weighs more than the remote be-
haviour of the distribution).
When multiple quantiles are of interest (as will fre-
quently be the case when QR is applied), a researcher
will often want to test whether found interquantile dif-
ferences are statistically significant (where the same set
of X’s is included for each quantile). This can easily be
tested by considering the covariances of cross-quantile
estimates and computing the p values of the resulting F
statistic for the encompassing Wald tests (Koenker and
Bassett 1982). This approach allows one to test whether
βqi for two or more different q’s are statistically different
from one another (Davino et al. 2014). Researchers do
not have to calculate these statistics themselves; soft-
ware that implements QR will do this for them. When
the regression coefficient for a specific quantile is not
statistically significant different from zero, a test of the
significance of the interquantile differences between it
and another quantile is not relevant.
An increasing number of software packages for
quantile regression allows researchers to apply QR to
their data, although OLS-type models such as (1) have
been implemented in statistical software more widely
and are routinely available in more software packages
than QR.
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